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Are civil-law notaries rent-seeking monopolists or essential market
intermediaries? Endogenous development of a property rights
institution in Mexico
Paavo Monkkonen
As the fourth contribution in the ‘Land’ section, this paper forms a research ‘diptych’
with the next paper by Levy. Whereas she focuses on the notarial institution in mid-
nineteenth century Mexico, this contribution examines it in a contemporary context.
The notary is one of the chief components of property rights protection in civil-law
systems, performing various public functions such as writing deeds for real estate
property. Yet notaries are considered an ‘inefﬁcient’ institution by many, due to the
perception of rent-seeking behavior enabled by their near-monopoly over validating
property rights claims. This study examines notaries in Mexico to unpack the
apparent contradiction in the role of notaries in economic development. I use a
combination of interviews with notaries and clients, and data on notarial practice and
bureaucratic outcomes across the country, to examine notaries’ social function. The
theoretical lens of endogenous development and institutional functionalism reveals an
alternate explanation for their seemingly high-cost services, as well as their role in
economic development. Mexican notaries have a dual social function: public
representative and private service provider. They perform diverse and essential
activities, which in other countries are performed by multiple actors such as real
estate agents, escrow ofﬁces and title insurance companies. Thus, what is perceived
as inefﬁciency by some can be interpreted as an efﬁcient response to the context in
which they operate, and their semi-privatized nature can overcome problems found in
other bureaucratic arrangements.
Keywords: property rights; notaries; Latin America; Mexico; endogenous
development; institutional function; street-level bureaucrats; corruption
1. Introduction
Papel y tinta, y pocajusticia [Paper and ink, and little justice]
– Spanish proverb
The seventeenth-century proverb above (cited in Burns 2005) is still a common perception
of Latin American notaries. Many characterize notaries in civil-law countries as a corrupt
group of schemers exploiting their position of authority to extract rents from society
(Medina Cervantes 2006; The Economist 2012). Others, and many scholars, argue that
notaries are an example of an inefﬁcient and archaic institution (Medina Cervantes 2006;
Aliaga et al. 2007; Figueroa 2009; Gonzalez, Sánchez Mayoral, and Hernández Alva
2012). While this argument is often linked to the historical origin of notaries as witnesses
to the claiming of land during the Spanish conquest of Latin America (Pohl 1968), recent
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scholarly work on notaries in Mexico echoes this popular sentiment and purports to provide
statistical evidence of notarial monopoly and consequent negative impacts on property
rights and housing markets (Gonzalez, Sánchez Mayoral, and Hernández Alva 2012).
These negative characterizations of notaries ﬁt with a common understanding of institutions
and development – that some institutional forms are ‘inefﬁcient’ and retard economic devel-
opment (Easterly and Levine 2003; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Aghion and
Howitt 2009).
Notaries have long operated as an integral component of civil legal systems. Although
they are generally not government employees, they are representatives of the public faith –
publica ﬁdes in Latin or fépública in Spanish (Closen and Dixon 1992). This gives them a
quasi-judicial character whereby their seal is equivalent to the verdict of a court, at least in
matters pertaining to property ownership and contracts. Thus, notaries have historically
been key ﬁgures in legal matters pertaining to economic activity, such as business creation,
lending and contract protection, and in the veriﬁcation of property transactions. As Figueroa
(2009, 159) states, ‘hardly any legal act takes place in civil law countries without encoun-
tering the intervention of a notary public’.
Economic historians contend that notaries played a fundamental role in the economic
apparatus of pre-capitalist societies through their function as ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal (1999) present evidence to this effect for Paris,
France, in the eighteenth century, and Levy (2010) makes a similar argument for nine-
teenth-century Yucatán. In those places, notaries essentially performed the function of
bank and ﬁnancial adviser and arranged contracts for lending money. They were able
to do both because of their formal legal and administrative position as well as their
informal knowledge of the social and ﬁnancial positions of members of their society.
In both places and markets where there is generally a dearth of information, the
notary’s job is especially important. As Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal (1998,
501, 503) assert: ‘as ﬁnancial intermediaries, (notaries) resolved problems of asymmetric
information in ﬁnancial markets in Paris’, and ‘they created a mechanism to solve poten-
tial hold-up problems’.
In contemporary societies, banks and other ﬁnancial institutions now carry out many of
the roles historically occupied by notaries. The notary today performs three types of func-
tions. They carry out some ‘lower-level’ functions that in other countries would be per-
formed by another type of actor, for example registering property ownership
documentation with the city property registries and tax assessors. Additionally, they are
also responsible for many activities that would be done through ex-post law enforcement
or courts in countries that follow common law, such as verifying liens and the validity
of the current title. Finally, notaries in civil legal systems also perform the duty of
private representation and advising, which are generally undertaken by lawyers or ﬁnancial
advisors in common-law countries (Tirado 1996).
One distinguishing feature of notarial systems then, is their quasi-privatized organiz-
ational form. Notarial ofﬁces carry out duties that in common-law countries are performed
by civil servants, yet they are essentially private businesses. Not only do they operate like
private service providers, their guild generally strongly limits the number of notarial seals in
a given city. State regulations often cap fees notaries can charge, but the notaries themselves
inﬂuence what these caps are. This constraint on the supply of public agents authorized to
provide services that protect property rights is argued by many to increase transaction costs
and, in doing so, stiﬂe economic activity and economic growth (World Bank 2004; The
Economist 2012).
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The theoretical lens of credibility – the idea that institutions persist because they
perform a particular and necessary function for society – provides a useful approach to
understanding the institution of notaries (Ho 2013, 2014). The approach suggests that
instead of accepting that an institutional form can be inefﬁcient or perverse, scholars
should seek to provide a thick description of their function in society and its context
(Geertz 1973), or an ‘institutional archaeology’, as it were (see the introduction to this col-
lection). As Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal (1998) argue, extra-governmental legal
structures and services provided by notaries can be seen as complementary to formal insti-
tutions rather than a substitute for them. The reasons for their persistence can be uncovered
by examining their social functions and the context in which they operate. All institutions
evolve endogenously – in spite of their initial design – and they can play a beneﬁcial role in
the development of markets notwithstanding what might be considered an ‘inefﬁcient’
form.
Thus, the present paper attempts to reconcile the two characterizations of notaries: as an
inefﬁcient institution or a core component of the property rights system. I do this by pro-
posing and answering three speciﬁc research questions. Do countries that rely on notaries
have a more costly and time-consuming property transfer process? Are there notarial mon-
opolies in Mexico that lead to more housing informality? How should we understand the
role of the notary in Mexico? I answer these questions separately using different sources
of data. Before the three analysis sections, I connect this paper to debates on governance,
land titling and property rights, corruption in public service provision, governmentality and
the global land grab. Then, section three is a brief historical overview of the notary in
Mexico.
The paper’s ﬁrst analysis section is global in scope. In it, I use data from 185 countries
to test the hypothesis that countries that use notaries for property transfers have a more
costly and time-consuming process. The hypothesis is rejected. The second analysis
section focuses on the role of notaries in the transfer of property in Mexico, through a criti-
cal examination of existing empirical work on the topic as well as an analysis of data on
notarial activity across the country’s 32 states. I question the interpretation of correlations
between the number of notaries in a state, their incomes and the share of informality by
Gonzalez, Sánchez Mayoral, and Hernández Alva (2012) as evidence of an inefﬁcient mon-
opoly. I propose alternative explanations for these associations, and test them by analyzing
new secondary data. I do not reject these alternate hypotheses, thus drawing into question
existing research.
Finally, I present the results of semi-structured interviews of notaries and their clients
conducted across Mexico, in which I examine notaries’ dual role as public representative
and service provider. This analysis suggests that although the majority of their work is
bureaucratic, in some cases their advisory capacity is extremely important through their
ability to serve as advocates for clients. Moreover, the evidence suggests that there is com-
petition between notary ofﬁces, and that their extra-governmental nature serves as an
important counterbalance to sometimes less-credible local governments. Notaries ensure
legal security for property by verifying existing claims to property on behalf of buyers,
ensuring there are no liens, and providing a protection of ownership with their seal, not
to mention advising clients and protecting against fraudulent sales. This means that property
sales in civil-law countries do not involve as many institutions as they do in common-law
countries, where real estate agents, title insurance companies, and escrow play an important
role. Not only are notaries essential to the functioning of the market economy in Mexico,
the semi-privatized institutional form allows them to overcome problems of corruption
found in other bureaucracies, and provide additional services to clients.
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2. Situating the notary in current debates over governance and development
The questions this paper addresses can be situated in four strands of literature: debates over
land titling programs, and the global land grab. These can be broadly characterized as gov-
ernance in developing countries, and all ﬂesh out details within the larger debate over the
relationship between institutions and development (Rodriguez-Pose 2013). The credibility
thesis (Ho 2013) elaborates on this dilemma in its theorization of endogenous development
of institutions, arguing that their functions adapt to play a beneﬁcial role in economic
growth in spite of what might appear to be an ‘inefﬁcient’ form or design. The work of
scholars in this area ought to focus on understanding institutional function. Tendler’s
(1997) research on Brazil, for example, was seminal in this vein. She challenges the empha-
sis on emulating institutional forms from developed countries, and argues for policy-
oriented research to focus on improving the actual functioning of bureaucracies. Similarly,
research by Grindle (2009) illustrates how changes in governance structures occur, in par-
ticular how decentralization in Mexico led to improvements in local governments in some
cases and failures in others. Her emphasis on the importance of leadership and politics in the
impacts of changing institutional form reﬂects many aspects of the endogenous develop-
ment theory.
The ﬁrst strand of literature is that focused on land and property rights regimes, and
debates about the importance of land titling programs. Scholars have long argued for the
importance of complete and simple systems of land records and cadastral systems (William-
son 1986), and more recent research on the topic purports to demonstrate clear beneﬁts to
providing title (e.g. Galiani and Schargrodsky 2004). Others argue that land titling
programs do not reduce poverty and that alternative forms of tenure effectively provide
property rights security (Payne 2002). More recently, the temporal nature of land titling
has been increasingly highlighted with reversion to informality in many cases after govern-
ments have granted title (Molina 2014). The notary is clearly a major component of the
titling system in Latin America, and a better understanding of the function of the notary
will contribute to the quality of this debate.
A second body of work is research focused on the actors in service delivery in devel-
oping countries and their daily practice. Issues of corruption and the power of ‘street
level’ bureaucrats (Lipsky 2010) are highly relevant to questions about the institutional
structure of the notarial profession in Mexico. As Lipsky (2010) points out, public
service workers are actually a kind of policymaker, with substantial discretion in their
implementation of programs and enforcement of rules. The question of how to organize
their activity under intense resource constraints means that while sometimes their decisions
favor clients, they often adopt practices that can be interpreted as corrupt and uneven. Thus,
the management structure and style, the motivations and the responses of street-level
bureaucrats are key elements in how well a public service system functions.
Some kinds of public services, like water or other public utilities, will be easier to
provide with a bureaucracy or to privatize and monitor, though there are still challenges
there (Crook and Ayee 2006). Other kinds of public services, such as property rights pro-
tection, are very hard to implement fairly or to privatize. As discussed in this paper later, the
partial privatization of the Mexican notary might actually avoid many of the problems with
civil servant bureaucracies, such as corruption under payment (Crook and Ayee 2006) and
their agency to organize labor in a bureaucracy as compared to their own notarial ofﬁce.
Scholars such as Davis (2004) have documented how other efforts to address corruption,
such as rotating bureaucrats through different posts, also do not solve this problem. Bureau-
cratic positions are often sold, with the price determined by the amount of rent someone can
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extract in that role. Further, as work by Mason (2014) on microﬁnance demonstrates, per-
sonal connections and the individual characteristics of actors on both sides of a transaction
can be important in understanding effectiveness and efﬁcacy in public servants.
A third area of literature is work on the role of bureaucracy and written records in gov-
ernmentality, or the way in which the state exercises control of its people. Gupta’s (2012)
seminal work on bureaucracy in India makes arguments about the diversity of the state’s
agents and their agendas. His discussion about purposeful use of arbitrariness for control
resonates closely with work on the ‘deliberate institutional ambiguity’ around property
rights to land in China (Ho 2001). Gupta’s most relevant discussion to the present work
is that focused on bureaucratic writing. He argues that state forms of writing such as
ﬁles and records are not simply records of actions, but rather constitutive of actions. He
highlights how lower level bureaucrats are very concerned about what gets written as
records make visible their governmentality, as well as how poor people, even if illiterate,
understand the power of ofﬁcial documents and are knowing participants in their use.
Although governance in India is based on a common-law bureaucracy and not the civil
law system of notaries, there are strong similarities in the roles of writing and record
keeping. Their juxtaposition raises the question of whether notaries’ role as paid service
providers means they will be more likely to work on behalf of their clients and thus
provide better results than actors in a bureaucratic system.
Finally, research on notaries is relevant to the growing body of work on the ‘global land
grab’ as an institution that could serve as a mitigating or compounding factor. Although the
discussion of the global land grab has focused primarily on agricultural land (Borras and
Franco 2013), there are important – and increasing – connections to urban land as the
world’s population becomes more urbanized. In this vein, Castellanos-Navarette and
Jansen (2015) highlight the role of the Mexican ejido in shaping land acquisition patterns.
The notary is also worth direct consideration in this context.
3. Notaries and property registration in Mexico
The notarial profession spread across the Americas with the expansion of the Spanish
empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Levy (2010) notes they are some-
times considered to have played the simple role of record-keeper, and were commonly
known as scribes or escribanos. In the act of recording names and deeds, they served the
function of legitimating the conquest and colonization of the Americas. Columbus’
scribe was part of the ﬁrst landing party in the ‘New World’ in 1492, and Hernan Cortes
began his career as a scribe (Téllez and Mario 2011).
In Mexico, notarial practice was profoundly shaped by this Spanish legacy after inde-
pendence. Early constitutions and governments of Mexico maintained a majority of rules
already in place (Castillo and del Pérez 1979). Governments throughout the nineteenth
century continued to update regulations of the profession with both practical goals (regulat-
ing the number of notaries) and idealistic goals (ensuring their ‘moral rectitude’). For
example, a law in 1840 set fee limits for various activities on the part of scribes. A
major change was later undertaken during the brief reign of the Emperor Maximilian in
1865, when the term ‘notary’ was adopted along with a law heavily inﬂuenced by existing
European norms. This law distinguished notaries from scribes by the type of actions they
could perform, with the emphasis on carrying the ‘public faith’ (Castillo and del Pérez
1979). The history of the notarial practice in Mexico has been used to demonstrate the resi-
lience and adaptability of the institution more generally (Téllez and Mario 2011).
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Mexico is a federalist country, but has had a centralized political system at various
points in its history. It is not surprising that the regulation of the notarial profession has
been subject to periodic changes associated with ﬂuctuations between federalism and cen-
tralism. Castillo and del Pérez (1979, 34) argue, ‘when the system has been more federalist
notarial matters are local, when the regime has been centralized, notarial functions are
general, applied in the whole country’.1 Under Article 40 of the Mexican Constitution of
1917, the power to regulate notaries was assigned to the states. Pedraza (2004) analyzes
the diversity of state laws governing notarial practice in Mexico and argues that there are
three components of notarial regulation consistent across states: ﬁrst, that notarial activities
are related to public order; second, that the notary is a trained lawyer; and third, that the
government can intervene in appointing notaries.
There is a notable diversity across states in Mexico with respect to the supply of
notaries, the fees they charge for services and outcomes such as processing times. Gonzalez,
Sánchez Mayoral, and Hernández Alva (2012) report on the variation in the rate of notarial
penetration across Mexican states and ﬁnd there is less than one notary per 100,000 people
in Tlaxcala and more than 10 per 100,000 people in Campeche, despite similar levels of
variation in their earnings in each place. Additionally, survey data show substantial vari-
ation in the outcomes that depend in part on notarial practice; for example, it takes less
than a week to register a property transfer in Colima and more than two months in
Mexico City (World Bank 2009).
Some of the diversity in the cost and time to register a property transfer stems from
differences in context, such as demand for services, land rents and the share of property
that has contested ownership. Mexico’s land-tenure system has a long and complicated
history, and in a review of this history, Assies (2008, 37) describes the period under colonial
rule as an ‘“agrarian mosaic” in which a variety of “interstitial” forms of land tenure
also played a role’. The Spanish crown distributed large numbers of different sorts of
deeds to land in addition to recognizing some indigenous land ownership systems.
Haciendas – large estates that employed controlled labor – were a deﬁning characteristic
of the Spanish colonial period and one that was fought against by leaders of the 1810
independence movement. Their importance varied dramatically across different regions
(Knight 2002), and the hacienda system was not abolished after independence. Up to
and during the regime of Porfírio Díaz, which ended in 1911, landownership in Mexico
became increasingly concentrated.
The ejido system created under Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 is one of
the most well studied social land-tenure systems. It was modeled after an Aztec system of
village land ownership and was adopted in the twentieth century in order to address centu-
ries of inequality in the distribution of land (Perramond 2008). The ejido is intended to be a
communal agricultural resource holding whereby ejido members have individual use rights
on what is communally owned land. Given that half of Mexico’s land area is considered to
have been designated as ejido in the middle of the twentieth century, it is not surprising that
many cities have expanded onto ejido land. This process is challenging for urbanization in
Mexico, as communally owned ejido lands are divided into lots and sold in a quasi-legal
manner to non-ejido members. Public effort to regularize land developed in this way
started in the early 1970s (Monkkonen 2012). The controversial reform of Article 27
1Translation by author; original text reads, ‘cuando el federalismo ha sido el sistema, la materia
notarial es local, cuando el régimen ha sido el centralismo, las disposiciones notariales son gener-
ales, de aplicación en todo el territorio’ Castillo and del Pérez (1979, 34).
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that intended to facilitate the privatization of ejido land – and was accompanied by a new
regularization effort – does not appear to have resulted in massive changes in land markets
or agricultural productivity (Jones and Ward 1998; Nuijten 2003).
A number of studies within Mexico argue that notaries are an archaic and monopolistic
institution. One piece of evidence in this regard is the tendency of sons and brothers of
notaries to become notaries. Medina Cervantes (2006) argues that this leads to institutional
inefﬁciency and monopolistic control. He claims that, ‘Las familias que se encuentran
dentro del Colegio de Notarios forman una red clientelar consanguínea y un monopolio
del mercado de trabajo’ [Families in the College of Notaries form a clientalistic network
of blood relations and have a monopoly over the labor market] (Medina Cervantes 2006,
92). He provides evidence of the familial relations between many notaries, though he
does not demonstrate that the market for their services is a monopoly.
Similarly, Arellano Ríos (2011) provides detailed information about the numerous pol-
itical ofﬁces that notaries in Jalisco have held, as well as the deep networks of familial
relationships between notaries. He states, ‘El cargo de notario público en Jalisco repre-
senta el culmen de una carrera en el campo jurídico local … se traduce en beneﬁcios eco-
nómicos y relaciones de mayor reconocimiento social’. [The position of notary public in
Jalisco is the culmination of a legal career … it translates into economic beneﬁts and
relationships with high social standing] (484). The author repeatedly points to the strong
family connections between notaries. For example, when discussing these connections,
he notes that ‘hay alrededor de 38 casos en los que la relación más evidente es padre-
hijo… ’ [there are around 38 cases in which the most evident relationship is father-son
… ] (487).
The inherited control of companies (scions) shows that nepotism hurts company per-
formance by limiting competition for jobs and thus yielding less competent employees
(Pérez-González 2006). Yet the practice can have an ‘efﬁcient’ function, in spite of its
rent-seeking motivation. Nepotism is likely to reduce transactions costs between notaries
by ensuring a high level of trust within the group of individuals (Simon 1991). This is
important for a group with the chief responsibility to guarantee the validity of ownership
claims, and is consistent with the central requirement of ‘moral rectitude’ imposed on
notaries throughout Mexican history. Moreover, the primary goal of notaries is not one
of maximizing returns as in a private-sector setting or even an equivalent of administrative
effectiveness, but rather one of serving the public faith. Mexico is rife with nepotism and it
is often associated with corruption (Lomnitz 2000). But cross-industry nepotism and cor-
ruption is different from the case of family control among notaries.
4. Property registration and the role of notaries internationally
The registration and transfer of ownership of land and landed property is complicated by
many factors, such as disputes over ownership, illegal squatting, irregular sales, conﬂicts
during an inheritance, or historical claims overlapping with contemporary ones (Oestereich
2000). In most industrialized nations, governmental institutions give transparency to prop-
erty transactions. In many developing countries, real estate transactions are more opaque.
The question of who owns land and whether it has encumbrances is one aspect of this
opacity. Even when information about ownership or liens is publically available, it can
be costly to access. Real estate is notoriously asymmetric, and sellers generally know
much more about the property being transacted than buyers do (Levitt and Syverson
2008). These factors are magniﬁed in countries like Mexico where a tumultuous political
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history and changes in governments are associated with reforms, redistribution and a result-
ing set of conﬂicting claims to land.
Transferring property from a seller to a buyer requires at least two steps. First, an agent
of the buying party must verify that the existing ownership claim is valid and that the prop-
erty is free from liens or encumbrances such as back property taxes. Second, the new
owner’s name must be set down in a public record of some sort. Since the action of the
transfer of ownership is an easy point at which the property can be reviewed by public
agencies, many additional actions are often imposed at this point. For example, regulations
can require environmental review, zoning review, urban design review, or a certiﬁcate of
the structural integrity and safety of the building. In some places an appraisal of the prop-
erty’s value is required in order to transfer title.
I use responses to detailed surveys from the World Bank’s Doing Business project to
illustrate the complexity of typical property transfers. I compare the procedures required
to transfer ownership in New York City and the Federal District of Mexico. The Doing
Business project has been collecting data on the procedures required as well as the time
and cost of various transactions (including property transfers) in every country in the
world since 2006. Surveyors conduct focus groups of participants in the process. In the
case of property transfers, developers, local government ofﬁcials, ﬁnancial-sector represen-
tatives, notaries and lawyers are all represented. To control for the potential inﬂuence of the
type of property transferred and the entity buying or selling,2 a hypothetical case is pre-
sented to the group: a two-story, 900-square-foot warehouse being bought and sold by
local companies.
The Doing Business project is emblematic of the ‘getting institutions right’ approach of
some international development policy. It is often used by international organizations to
promote regulatory reform, with countries getting positive feedback for reducing delays
and costs of transactions such as starting a business or registering property (World Bank
2009). This effort was inspired by the methodology of Hernando De Soto, who began
efforts to document the time and cost of regulations around business formalization in
Peru (1989). Thus, while it provides a useful source of comparative data, it is based on
debatable assumptions about institutional form and development.
In New York City, transferring a building takes 12 days, costs USD86,000,3 requires
four steps and six documents, and involves four actors in addition to the buyer and
seller. In Mexico City, this transfer takes 74 days, costs USD25,600, requires seven
steps and 19 documents, and involves six actors in addition to buyer and seller. This com-
parison shows that it is more time consuming and bureaucratically cumbersome to transfer
property ownership in Mexico City than in New York City. Even in the United States there
are a number of costly bureaucratic procedures. Table 1 shows the main steps in the process
of property transfer for these two cities.
A close inspection of the differences between the two cities reveals multiple causes for
the more cumbersome process in Mexico – none of which are the notaries themselves. First,
some of the procedures required in Mexico to transfer ownership are not required in the
United States to transfer ownership, but are requirements for obtaining ﬁnancing.
Because a much higher percentage of property transactions occur with ﬁnancing in the
United States, the system has various requirements to obtain a mortgage to purchase
2Large companies are treated differently than small ﬁrms or individuals in many contexts.
3The Doing Business data report costs as a percentage of the value of the property, but also list the
estimated value of the hypothetical property.
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property but not to record the change of ownership. This means that in practice these
requirements are almost always fulﬁlled in both countries. For example, an appraisal or
valuation of the property is not required to transfer ownership in the United States, but it
is required to obtain ﬁnancing.
Additionally, some of the procedures in Mexico take more time and cost more than
in New York because more documentation is needed. For example, obtaining a certiﬁ-
cate that the water bill is paid requires paperwork, such as proof of address and a copy
of the photo ID of the seller. This is because of higher levels of non-payment of water
bills in Mexico. Lastly, when archives are not available online or computerized, every-
thing takes longer and requires more person-hours to carry out. It is not surprising then,
that notary fees are higher in places where people are responsible for many more
activities.
In spite of the vast contextual differences between Mexico City and New York City, the
idea that reducing bureaucratic requirements will stimulate economic development persists.
Chang (2010) documents this for several areas and various reports use Doing Business data
to argue that where reforms have been undertaken to reduce steps and lower the costs of
registering property, increases in the rate of property registration have followed (World
Bank 2010).
Research on notaries’ role in the ‘cost of doing business’ presents a more complex
picture. In a study of Latin American notaries, Malavet (1998) argues that a lack of under-
standing of fundamental differences between legal systems permeates comparative aca-
demic work on the topic. An example of this is the study of Amin and Haidar (2011),
who analyze the differences in costs of property registration between countries with
common law and those with civil law systems, controlling for other characteristics.
They purport to ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly lower cost to register property in common-law
Table 1. Steps for transferring property in New York City, USA, and Mexico City, Mexico.
Mexico City United States
No. Procedure No. Procedure
1 The notary obtains a certiﬁcate of good
standing with the water service
1 Obtain a title report, typically from one of
many competing private companies
2 The notary obtains the Zoning Certiﬁcate
of the property from the Ministry of
Urban Development and Housing
2 Conduct an environmental review,
typically conducted by a private ﬁrm
3 The notary obtains a non-encumbrance
certiﬁcate from the Public Registry
3 The buyer (usually through an agent or
attorney) completes forms needed for
transfer such as title insurance, safety
compliance and general insurance
4 The notary checks the good standing of the
seller on the property tax with the
Treasury
4 The title is recorded with the County Clerk
(with the applicable tax forms and proof
of payment)
5 The notary requests a commercial
valuation of the property
6 The notary formalizes the sale purchase
agreement (seller will also have to pay
the income tax and the value added tax)
7 Registration of the transfer of title at the
Public Registry of Property of the
Federal District
Source: World Bank (2013).
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countries.4 Yet when they separate notarial costs from non-notary costs in their analysis, they
ﬁnd that the difference is driven by non-notary costs. This highlights the importance of context,
as there are many regulations that can be and are imposed at the point of sale. They mention
that there is a greater tendency to obtain revenues from fees and assets in civil-law countries as
compared to taxes on income ﬂows in the common-law tradition (Amin and Haidar 2011);
thus, their ﬁndings do not directly address the efﬁciency of notarial systems.
4.1 Are property transfers in notary countries more costly?
In this section, I test the simple hypothesis that countries that use notaries to register prop-
erty transfers have a more costly and time-consuming property transfer registration process.
The conventional wisdom, from scholars who study differences between countries based on
their legal system, would predict those countries using notaries would have a more costly
and cumbersome property registration process. I test this hypothesis using data from the
Doing Business project for 185 countries. For each country, I examine detailed information
on the steps required to transfer property, and then group countries into three categories:
those that require the use of notaries, those that do not, and those that mention notaries
as an optional agent.5 In 98 countries, participation of a notary is required. In 23 countries,
a notary is mentioned as an optional agent in some steps (a lawyer is usually the other
option). A notary is not mentioned in the property registration process for 64 countries.
After categorizing countries, I examine differences in the three outcome variables gath-
ered by the Doing Business project: the number of procedures, the average time to carry out
the process, and the cost as a percentage of property value (to control for differences in
levels of economic development) for these three groups of countries. Table 2 presents a
summary of this comparison. It is clear that on all three measures of regulatory ‘cumber-
someness’, the difference between countries requiring a notary and those that do not
mention a notary is minimal. In fact, countries requiring the participation of a notary
have an average cost that is almost a full percent lower and a time period almost one
month shorter than countries that do not require a notary; this is the opposite relationship
to what conventional wisdom suggests.
To test whether the differences in time and costs between these three groups are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, I perform a t-test of the difference of means. Countries where notaries are
an optional agent in the process have signiﬁcantly lower costs, fewer steps and a quicker
property registration system than countries that either require the use of a notary or do
not use notaries at all. But the observed difference between countries that do and do not
require notaries is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The level of economic development of countries that use a notary as part of the property
transfer process varies widely. Notaries are required in high-income countries like France
and Spain, but also lower income countries like Yemen and Angola. Other research on the
costs of property registration (Monkkonen and Ronconi 2016) has shown that there is a
strong correlation between economic development and the costs of property registration.
Including the log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a control variable in the
4One drawback to the methodology is that they do not consider city-level characteristics, such as
population, which can impact the often-localized bureaucracy of property registration. In a similar
analysis, Monkkonen and Ronconi (2013) ﬁnd no difference between common- and civil-law
countries.
5A list of countries in the three categories is available in Appendix 1.
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statistical test of a difference between notary and non-notary countries presented here does
not affect the outcome (full results available upon request).
5. Are notaries in Mexico an inefﬁcient institution?
The argument about nepotism and monopoly as a bottleneck to development is made and
apparently substantiated with data in an early Doing Business report (World Bank 2004) as
well as later reports that assess subnational variation in Mexico (e.g. World Bank 2007,
2014). The report in 2004 presents a statistical analysis showing that notaries make starting
businesses more difﬁcult by imposing increased costs and delays. Speciﬁcally, it states that
‘notary costs are $875, almost 80 percent of the total costs’ (World Bank 2004, 26–27
[USD]). These numbers should be interpreted with caution. They are not analyzed accord-
ing to the services rendered for this cost. Notaries perform many functions that other entities
perform in other countries, and thus costs should be considered accordingly.
More systematic empirical work6 by Gonzalez, Sánchez Mayoral, and Hernández Alva
(2012) across Mexican states appears to support the argument by testing the hypotheses that
fewer notaries per capita leads to higher earnings per notary, and that this makes formaliza-
tion of property inaccessible and less prevalent. They argue that notaries intentionally limit
the expansion of notarial seals (licenses to practice) in order to reduce supply and extract
more earnings. By doing so, they reduce the prevalence of formal property ownership.
To test their hypotheses, they model (1) notary earnings and (2) the probability of a property
having a title as a function of the number of notaries in a state, along with control variables
such as average property characteristics and attributes of the different Mexican states. The
models show that in states with more notaries per capita, their earnings are lower and there
is a higher likelihood of property having a title.
There are some problems with the econometrics in the paper and the interpretation of
results. First, the regression models fail to account for a signiﬁcant degree of endogeneity.
Table 2. Average number of steps, time and cost to register property transfers for countries with and
without requirements for notary participation in property registration.
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Countries without notary participation (N = 64)
Steps 5.8 2.4 1 13
Time (days) 60.2 81.4 1 513
Costa 6.6 5.1 0 28
Countries requiring notary participation (N = 98)
Steps 6.2 2.1 2 14
Time (days) 51.5 51.2 2.5 312
Costa 5.7 4.7 0 21
Countries with notary participation as an option (N = 23)
Steps 4.4 2.2 1 8
Time (days) 25.4 19.9 1 70
Costa 4.6 3.4 0 11
SD: standard deviation. aCost is measured as a percent of the value of the property.
Source: Author, and World Bank (2010).
6No other similar empirical research on this topic was found for Mexico. Arruñada (1996) analyzes
Spanish notaries but has very different ﬁndings, as discussed later.
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There is likely a multi-directional relationship between notarial efﬁciency, earnings and
formality in property. As Rodriguez-Pose (2013) elegantly describes, disentangling the
relationship between institutions and economic development is near impossible. In this par-
ticular case, more efﬁcient notaries would earn more money because they can process more
transactions, so there might be less of them. This superior service would be conducive to
economic development but also a product of it, as notaries in more developed regions
will likely be better educated and more accountable to their better educated clients.
There will be more formality in these regions for multiple reasons, and this might be spur-
iously correlated to the number of notaries.
Additionally, there is a signiﬁcant threat of omitted variables in their models. Regions
with more irregular land development have fewer notaries per capita, but also more poverty,
an underdeveloped governance system and likely more political monopoly. To the credit of
Gonzalez, Sánchez Mayoral, and Hernández Alva (2012), they include some municipal-
level controls7 such as an index of marginality from the National Population Council
(CONAPO), but their modeling does not demonstrate causality or the direction of inﬂuence.
This is a problem with much of the cross-sectional empirical work on institutions, as dis-
cussed by Chang (2010) – cross-sectional analysis of historical processes is not causal.
With regards to interpretation, there is a missing discussion about the number of
notaries and the number of employees they have. In states with fewer notaries per capita,
each notary has more employees. Moreover, the number of workers per notary is highly
correlated with the log of earnings per notary, and variation in the former explains
nearly two thirds of the variation in the latter. This suggests another plausible explanation
for the higher earnings of notaries in places where they are less prevalent: they organize
their business differently. Thus, the higher earnings can be interpreted as a more efﬁcient
use of human resources rather than as ‘constrained supply’.
Last, and perhaps most important, the argument about the relationship between the
supply of notaries and their ‘effectiveness’ can be turned around if viewed within a
broader perspective of regional economic development. Using the costs of property regis-
tration as evidence of inefﬁciency ignores the fact that some property rights contexts are
more challenging than others. Higher costs can result from there being many land
parcels with multiple claimants due to historical events. Notaries in these areas play a
larger role in promoting development by overseeing a historically more complicated prop-
erty rights landscape (Villaseñor Pujol 2009).
I examine this issue empirically by correlating the cost of property registration and time
delays with the number of notaries per capita. I combine data from Gonzalez, Sánchez
Mayoral, and Hernández Alva (2012) with World Bank survey data (2012). Table 3
reports summary characteristics, including the number of notaries per 100,000 residents,
the number of employees per notary and average earnings per notary by state. There is a
wide variation in the rate of notarial penetration across Mexican states – less than one
notary per 100,000 people in Tlaxcala, to more than 10 per 100,000 in Campeche – as
well as their earnings. Table 3 also includes data on the number of steps, time and costs
to register property for the largest city in each state in Mexico (World Bank 2009).
There are 31 states in Mexico, plus a Federal District that functions like a state.
Table 4 reports pairwise correlation coefﬁcients that assess the correlation between
7But the size of the metropolitan area, an extremely important factor in any analysis of property
markets, is not included. Instead they include a variable describing the size of the house’s ‘locality’,
which is like a neighborhood and basically irrelevant for properties in medium or large cities.
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Table 3. Notaries per 100,000 people; employees per notary; average notary earnings; and the steps,













4.3 8.1 307.6 5 12 1.7
Tuxtla Gutiérrez,
Chiapas
2.8 5.4 199.4 5 19 1.7
Colima, Colima 4.4 7.9 591 5 5 2.8
Campeche, Campeche 10.1 3.1 - 4 22 2.7
Veracruz, Veracruz 2.7 7.6 446.9 6 17 1.8
Morelia, Michoacán 2.5 6.3 143.2 6 13 3.2
Celaya, Guanajuato 8.0 4.8 194.6 7 18 1.8
Hermosillo, Sonora 5.4 7.7 572.9 6 12 3.7
San Luis Potosí, San
Luis Potosí
2.6 8.8 309 6 33 2.4
Culiacán, Sinaloa 3.1 5.9 229.7 5 15 4.3
Zacatecas, Zacatecas 2.7 5.2 114.6 6 22 3.3
Ciudad Juárez,
Chihuahua
2.3 9.6 667.7 5 27 3.3
Monterrey, Nuevo
Leon
3.6 11.2 878.3 6 25 3.2
Pachuca de Soto,
Hidalgo
3.3 6.8 342.1 4 27 4.1
Villahermosa,
Tabasco
3.5 5.7 - 6 34 3.1
Oaxaca de Juárez,
Oaxaca
1.7 6.1 107.4 5 46 3.2
Tlalnepantla, Edo. de
México
1.2 12.4 936.8 6 46 2.8
Querétaro, Querétaro 7.0 15.8 1996 6 25 4.2
Puebla, Puebla 1.9 8.4 699.6 7 40 2.6
Tlaxcala, Tlaxcala 0.9 9.2 168.3 4 34 4.3
Tijuana, Baja
California
1.7 12.3 2120 8 22 3.6
Torreón, Coahuila 9.0 6.1 326.8 6 33 4.3
Mérida, Yucatán 4.1 5.4 349.2 10 33 2.6
Cuernavaca, Morelos 1.3 14.1 3303 8 15 6.0
Acapulco, Guerrero 1.2 9.3 182 10 30 3.2
Matamoros,
Tamaulipas
6.3 5.0 220.4 9 29 3.5
Tepic, Nayarit 6.2 6.3 153.7 7 37 4.1
La Paz, Baja
California Sur
6.4 8.3 1713 8 44 3.4
Guadalajara, Jalisco 4.9 8.5 581.4 8 38 4.0
Durango, Durango 3.1 5.8 250.7 9 30 5.1
Benito Juárez,
Quintana Roo
3.1 10.1 353.7 8 64 4.3
Ciudad de México 3.0 19.6 2741 7 74 5.3
aIn thousands of 2009 Mexican Pesos. bCost is measured as a percentage of the value of the property.
Sources: Gonzalez, Sánchez Mayoral, and Hernández Alva (2012); World Bank (2009).
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−0.09 0.39* 0.17 0.26
Cost to register
propertyb
−0.03 0.43** 0.34*** 0.19 0.31*
Households in city
(Ln)
−0.01 0.50** 0.40** 0.27 0.39** 0.08
State GDP per
capita (Ln)
0.30 0.39* 0.47*** 0.12 0.37* 0.32* 0.47***
GDP: gross domestic product. aExcludes the state and city of Campeche because it is an extreme outlier in terms of GDP per capita as a result of oil extraction and reﬁning. bCost is
measured as a percentage of the value of the property. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level.






variables describing notary organization and property registration processes, and the
economic development characteristics of states and their largest cities. Richer states
have larger cities and more notaries per capita; the correlation coefﬁcients are
0.47 and 0.30, respectively, and statistically signiﬁcant. Notaries in larger, richer
cities earn more money (correlation coefﬁcients of 0.40 and 0.47), and do so for mul-
tiple reasons.
It is probable that the agglomerative forces that lead some regions to develop a stronger
economy than others (Storper 2013) also lead to more notaries per capita. What does this
mean for the ﬁndings about lower numbers of notaries per capita being associated with a
smaller share of houses having a title? The explanation that fewer notaries make it more
difﬁcult to obtain a title is a possibility. There is a plausible alternate explanation,
however. Places where fewer properties have title are also less likely to develop for a
number of reasons, such as the type of governance that includes low numbers of notaries.
This second hypothesis is not tested by Gonzalez, Sánchez Mayoral, and Hernández Alva
(2012). Importantly, the strong correlation between more notaries and a strong economy
suggests they are an important feature of economic development rather than an impediment
to it.
If the analysis is expanded to include outcomes related to how ‘cumbersome’ property
registration is, then the relationships are more complicated. The speed and cost of the
process of property registration are not correlated with the number of notaries in a state.
In fact, the only statistically signiﬁcant relationships with the ‘ease’ of property registration
are for city size and the proxy for economic development. Larger, richer cities have more
‘cumbersome’ processes of property registration, though this partly reﬂects the fact that
there is simply a higher volume of activity in this area. In sum, the analysis of data on
notary organization and fees do not clearly indicate that notaries are a drag to economic
development. The relationship is endogenous and more concentrated effort is needed to dis-
entangle the direction of causality.
6. Why do notaries in Mexico persist?
To understand the persistence of notarial writing of deeds in Mexico – a seemingly
superﬂuous property rights institution – it is important to examine the credibility of
the practice through an understanding of its social function (Ho 2013, 2014). The
thesis that institutions persist due to their credibility seeks to explain the contradiction
of ‘inefﬁcient’ institutions facilitating development. Credibility in this sense refers to
the belief that an institution is not subject to arbitrary change. The Mexican notary
has persisted through major transformations of the political system – independence
from Spain, a revolution, civil war, and several democratic transitions occurred in rela-
tively recent decades (Margadant 1969).
The function of the notary has evolved over time. Levy (2010) documents their role
as ﬁnancial intermediary in the nineteenth century in the absence of banks. Not only did
they authorize contracts and provide legal protection for property rights, they advised
clients and connected lenders with borrowers. Notarial activity today revolves around
property transfers and deeds; yet, as the subsequent discussion of interviews with
notaries and their clients demonstrates, their dual role as legal authority and adviser
remains.
In order to answer my research questions in more depth and to develop a deeper under-
standing of their dual role as an extra-governmental legal authority and service provider, I
conducted interviews with notaries and their clients. I contacted the presidents of all 32
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colleges8 of notaries in Mexico via email and telephone in July of 2014 and interviewed 10
of them over the phone during the following two months.9 Interviews lasted roughly one
hour and were conducted in a semi-structured manner. I asked notaries questions in the fol-
lowing areas: the services they provided to clients and the varying importance of services
such as writing property deeds and advising on ﬁnancial matters, common problems
encountered when writing deeds, the relationship between the college of notaries and the
state government, the control that state colleges had over the number of notary licenses
issued, the impact of changes in technology on their practice, the social function of notaries
and examples of cases where they provided more than straightforward services.
I also interviewed notaries’ clients. A large-scale survey was not feasible, but during the
month of September 2014, I reached out to a number of large and small housing developers
in the city of Tijuana, Baja California, via telephone and email. I also interviewed 12 home-
owners. Short interviews were conducted over the telephone and in person to assess the
market for notary services and to identify moments of conﬂict over property where a
notary played a key advisory role. The majority of interviewees had nothing to report
about the role of the notary in their property transactions, presumably because for them
the notary practically functioned as a bureaucrat.
Almost everyone I interviewed recognized that the fees for a given service varied
among the different notary ofﬁces in the city. Some ofﬁces charged as much as two
times the price that others did, for simple services. From these discussions, two cases of
conﬂict stood out (discussed below), both of which give rich evidence of the role of the
notary as both adviser and legal authority.
6.1 Monopoly, competitive market or cartel?
State governments set fees for different notary services, but in many states, notaries stated
that these ofﬁcial fees do not actually govern practice. Moreover, several of the notaries
interviewed framed the variation in their fees for the same service in terms of a social con-
tribution. More than one interviewee stated they charged people what they were able to
afford in order to help those with fewer resources, rather than to extract money from
those with more. Another way to frame this is that they charge as much as they can to
each client, in a form of price discrimination.
A majority of notaries’ work is in property registration – several estimated the property
registration share of business as 80 percent. When asked why many people do not have
deeds for their property or do not change deeds to their name when purchasing property,
most notaries emphasized a lack of understanding and information rather than the cost of
the transaction. Many of the homeowners interviewed, on the other hand, did note the
high cost of registering a property transfer. More than one mentioned delaying the notarized
transfer of deed after purchasing a property because of the cost, for as long as a decade. The
property owners interviewed were not a random sample so this information should not be
taken as representative. Only one low-income homeowner was interviewed, and it is more
likely that the middle-income homeowners I spoke with are relatively well informed about
legal rules governing property.
8Every state in Mexico and the Federal District has a college of notaries that serves as their association
and leadership.
9Baja California, Campeche, Chihuahua, Hidalgo, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Tabasco and
Veracruz.
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The notary college presidents were also asked about their relationship with the state
government, especially in terms of its regulatory function. Many of them dismissed the
importance of fee-setting by state law and the role of state governments in allocating notar-
ial licenses. In fact, not all state governments are vested with the power to allocate licenses.
All 10 notaries interviewed thought their states fees were lower than the national average,
even when this did not seem to be true according to other sources of data. One did mention
the state government’s policy on notarial licenses as a problem, and allowed that there had
been some tension between the governor’s ofﬁce and the college of notaries. The notaries
interviewed also highlighted their role in facilitating the development of low-income
housing through discounts on deeds written for housing built through the quasi-governmen-
tal ﬁnance system (Monkkonen 2011).
Clearly, the market for notarial services in any given state or city is not a monopoly,
given that there are multiple notaries operating. It could be characterized as a cartel10 to
the extent that there is collusion between notaries on the supply and price of different ser-
vices. Notary fees are usually regulated by the state government and fees are published in
ofﬁcial newspapers. Interviews revealed that these ofﬁcial prices did not correspond to
actual prices and notaries were able to charge more or less depending on their reputation
and their expectations about the ability of clients to pay. When asked about variation in
prices, notaries used the metaphors of fruit and medical services to point out that although
they technically provide identical services, there is variation in the quality or reliability of
notaries. Their ofﬁce locations imply different costs and they provide different levels of
attention to clients depending on client needs.
The merging of public and private services in notarial practice is one of the reasons for
such contradictory views of notaries. The fact that different notaries charge different prices
for the same service is frequently cited as evidence of the notarial institution being mono-
polistic and rent-seeking. A newspaper article from Saltillo, Coahuila, points out that the
cost of a letter from parents permitting their underage child to travel outside of the
country can vary between 250 and 500 pesos (Olinda Morán 2013). For private services
such as ﬁnancial advising, education or medical practice, it is standard for different pro-
fessionals to charge different amounts for a very similar service. The reason this variation
is controversial for notaries is that their services have a public or governmental quality, even
if in fact the quality of their service differs.
Nonetheless, price was not mentioned when clients were asked about the way they
chose their notary. Rather, almost all homeowners and developers interviewed mentioned
word of mouth from friends or relatives as the way they selected a notary. Clients did com-
plain about prices but when asked about shopping around for a different notary the unan-
imous response was that the most important thing was being able to trust the notary to do a
good job, not the price.
6.2 Extra-governmental authority
One theme that emerged regarding the credibility of notaries was their status as a legal auth-
ority separate from the government bureaucracy. Developers mentioned the advisory ser-
vices of notaries and the importance of the fact that their legal authority can be hired.
They were seen to protect the interests of their clients as a lawyer would. Local
10The Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes a cartel as ‘An association of manufacturers or suppliers with
the purpose of maintaining prices at a high level and restricting competition’.
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governments in Mexico can change dramatically with every new administration and there is
often potential for corruption at this level (Fox and Hernández 1992). Therefore, extra-gov-
ernmental authority is often more credible as an objective judge of disputes.
There is an important difference between the public or governmental services (such as
providing legal certainty to ownership or verifying a transaction with the public faith)
notaries provide in Mexico – functions that courts undertake in other countries – and the
private services (such as advising and business support services) (Arruñada 1996). Arru-
ñada (1996) argues that there are economies of scope in having the same person provide
both types of services. For example, the intervention of one notary can replace both
parties’ lawyers and a judge as required in a common-law system. Several notaries men-
tioned that they saved money for all involved in cases of conﬂict by reducing litigation
because they could represent both sides and mediate disagreements. As the President of
the College of Notaries for the state of Campeche stated, ‘El notario es un mediador.
[The notary is a mediator]’. He explained that because notaries help both parties to a trans-
action, they reduce costs by not engaging the courts and facilitate parties coming to an
agreement.
The fact that notaries work outside the governmental bureaucracy also lends credibility
to the functions they serve around property rights for land and housing. The tumultuous
history of land ownership in Mexico has resulted in much of the land area in cities being
developed in a technically illegal manner. For example, research on land regularization
in the city of Tijuana shows that almost two thirds of the parcels were originally irregular
(Monkkonen 2012), as was a large share of the metropolitan area of Mexico City (Ward
1997). While in comparison to some places notaries seem to charge higher rates for regis-
tering a property, this registration has a higher value. Governmental power is likely more
arbitrary than notarial power in this context, and being able to hire a notary as a represen-
tative is therefore worthwhile.
6.3 Advisers and advocates
One of the most salient features of the notary interviews was the emphasis they placed on
their role as an advisor and advocate for their clients. When asked about their social func-
tion, almost all notaries ﬁrst offered a statement about providing legal security for property
rights generally and then asserted that a major function was to assist clients in ﬁguring out
what to do with their property and businesses for their own legal security. The President of
the College of Notaries for the state of Baja California conﬁrmed the understanding of the
dual function of notarial practice outlined previously, when she explained:
Los asesoramos. Ellos vienen aquí con su problemática. Nosotros asesoramos jurídicamente
como proteger su patrimonio. Hay muchas personas que no entienden y no saben, y a veces
hay personas o abogados que los pueden enredar. Vienen a nosotros, le damos una explicación
amplia, incluso no les cobramos la asesoría. [We advise them (the clients). They come here
with their problem. We give them advice on how to legally protect their property. Many
people do not understand and do not know, and sometimes there are people or lawyers who
can confuse them further. They come to us, we give them a thorough explanation, and we
do not even charge for our advice.]
The two personal stories of conﬂict over property that came from client interviews – one
from a homeowner and one from a property developer – best demonstrate the importance
of notary advisory and advocacy. The ﬁrst case is of a woman whose husband had recently
passed away. The husband had various properties, some of which were warehouses. These
18 Paavo Monkkonen
warehouses were in the name of his wife, but the husband’s lover got an unscrupulous
notary to falsify a document giving her legal claim to the warehouses. In this case, the
wife’s notary represented her claims in a court case and demonstrated that her documen-
tation was in fact the valid one. In this case, the notary acted as a lawyer would in other
countries in that they represented their client as advocate and adviser.
In the second case, a young couple sought to purchase a house. They found one they
liked and agreed on a price with the seller. As in most property transactions in Mexico, a
contract for deed was written where ownership is not transferred until the full price is
paid, and payment is not instantaneous but occurs over some period of time. The couple
paid the seller the down payment and made an arrangement to pay the remainder after
some months after obtaining ﬁnancing from their family and a bank loan. When they
sought out the seller to make the ﬁnal payment, he began evading them. At that point
they sought counsel from a notary. After some investigation, the notary determined that
this seller had a history of conducting these scams. If buyers did not make the ﬁnal
payment by a certain date, the contract for purchasing the property was invalidated and
the seller would keep the down payment. In this case, the notary exerted legal inﬂuence
to force the seller to accept the ﬁnal payment and the couple purchased the house.
In countries such as the United States, many of these advisory and advocacy services
would be provided by a real estate agent.11 Real estate agents charge a non-trivial percen-
tage of the transaction cost for their advisory services (ﬁve percent in the United States).
The fact that the notary performs many functions equivalent to a real estate agent– in
addition to those of an escrow agent and title insurance company – means that their com-
mission could be considered relatively low for the services rendered. Also, by concentrating
various functions into one ofﬁce, they can achieve some economies of scale and reduce
overall transaction costs in the property market.
7. Conclusions
This paper addresses an apparent contradiction in the role of the notary in the Mexican
property rights system using the lens of credibility to analyze the social functions that
the notary performs. Contrary to the view of notaries as ‘inefﬁcient’ bottlenecks to econ-
omic development, they play an important role in maintaining property rights systems
within the context of the country’s legal, political and economic systems. They provide
legal security for property transfers to households without going through courts or using
title insurance, as occurs in other countries. In a context with unreliable public bureauc-
racies, this semi-private service can be a great advantage. In addition, they provide a
number of advisory services related to property in places without a formal real estate
profession.
This paper examines the role of notaries internationally and in Mexico in three sections.
In the ﬁrst, I show that registering a property transfer is not more costly or time consuming
in countries that use notaries as a major actor in this process. In the second, I evaluate claims
11Real estate agents do exist in Mexico but most residential property transactions do not use one.
Although there is an association of real estate professionals (Asociación Mexicana de Profesionales
Inmobiliarios (AMPI)), it is not a similarly organized group to those in countries like the United
States. Their fees are not the well-established ﬁve percent that they are in the United States, partly
because they provide fewer advisory services and partly because they are less well organized and
thus do not have the wealth of information about property markets to which agents in the United
States have access.
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that notaries in Mexico are rent-seeking monopolists with an empirical analysis of notarial
activity across the country’s 32 states. I reinterpret the state-level associations between the
number of notaries, their incomes and the share of housing informality put forth by Gonza-
lez, Sánchez Mayoral, and Hernández Alva (2012). I propose and test alternative expla-
nations, and ﬁnd that notaries’ use of larger ofﬁces and more staff in the more
economically dynamic regions of Mexico can explain both their higher earnings and the
lower levels of informality.
Rather than acting as a retarding inﬂuence on economic development, then, the regional
variation across Mexico shows a positive correlation between notarial activities and econ-
omic growth. Of course, this does not demonstrate a causal relationship. In order to more
directly evaluate this connection, models need to pay more attention to city-level factors.
For example, using ﬁxed-effects time-series models to controls for time-invariant character-
istics of cities would be especially useful. One notable possibility in this vein would be to
analyze occasions when state governments issue new notarial seals, as natural experiments.
The data requirements of these efforts are substantial. Another approach would be to use
large-scale surveys of notaries’ clients to gather data on their functions and costs.
The paper’s third section presents the results of semi-structured interviews of notaries and
their clients, conducted across the country. Based on these interviews, I argue that notaries are
importantmarket intermediaries inMexico. They serve a number of key functions in property
transaction and have credibility beyond that of the local government. For some developers,
this is because of their advisory nature and because they carry legal authority and can be hired,
and are thus seen to protect the interests of their clients as a lawyer would. In this context, the
evidence to date also suggests that there is competition between notary ofﬁces and great vari-
ation in the abilities and credibility among notary ofﬁceswithin a city. Itmight be the case that
notary colleges do lobby the state government to reduce the number of licenses in order to
charge higher prices, but there is by no means a monopoly in effect.
In addition to better empirical analysis of the role of notaries within Mexico, future
research in this area might beneﬁt from examining how credibility reacts to the meeting
or overlap of two different systems through migration or at international borders. An
example of this overlap in credibility systems relevant to the present paper is found in
the growing number of people from the United States who purchase property in Mexico
(Schafran and Monkkonen 2011). Cases of evictions of people from the United States
from properties thought to be purchased through fully legal channels (Gordon 2002)
have led to an increasing demand for recognizable title insurance in Mexico. Clemm
(2007) analyzes this clash of two systems, and argues that because of differences in legal
systems, title insurance does not actually fulﬁll the same function in Mexico that it does
in the United States. First, in Mexico notaries do a title search and verify title, and,
second, there are many protections for the buyer under Mexican law. Because of these
steps, most actual insurance policies do not cover many of the deﬁciencies in title that actu-
ally arise in Mexico because of these existing checks on the process. In fact, Clemm (2007)
argues that the main reason to purchase title insurance in Mexico is to simplify the process
of claiming retribution from the seller.
Another way to examine the question of the role of notaries in development through this
same lens of credibility is to consider their importance in periods (or places) in which pol-
itical power and arbitrary changes would be more likely to undermine property rights.12
12Similarly, with technological changes, the importance of a deed written by a notary might become
less (or more) important. What happens when there are exogenous political or technological
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A salient example is provided in this volume’s next paper, which takes the analysis back in
time, more particularly to mid-nineteenth century Mexico. Despite the socio-political
turmoil of the Mexican revolution, the state of Yucatan experienced a marked economic
boom in the absence of formal credit and banking institutions. The following paper ascer-
tains that notaries fulﬁlled a critical role in that respect: facilitating access to credit.
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Appendix 1. Countries with and without requirements for notary participation in
property registration
Countries without notary participation in property registration
Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussa-
lam, Cambodia, Canada, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominica, Ethiopia, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana,
Guyana, Hong Kong SAR, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Rep.,
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South
Africa, South Sudan, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland,
Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, China, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United
Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
Countries with required notary participation in property registration
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Dem. Rep.Congo, Rep. Congo, Costa Rica, Cote
d’Ivoire, Croatia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Estonia, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Puerto Rico (U.S.), Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Seychelles, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Switzerland, Tajikistan,
Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, West
Bank and Gaza, and Yemen
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Countries with notary participation in property registration as an option
Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Austria, Comoros, Czech Republic, Finland, Georgia, Grenada,
Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Jamaica, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Montenegro, Portugal, Russia,
Samoa, Slovak Republic, Sudan, Sweden, Tanzania, and Tunisia
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